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ABSTRACT

Organizations develop crisis readiness to avoid and mitigate crises. This study investigates several factors that
influence crisis readiness, including market dynamism, perceived likelihood of a crisis (PLC), and firm size. It
also evaluates the impact of crisis readiness on firm performance. Results from a PLS-SEM assessment of 301
managers in the United States suggest that market dynamism drives firm performance while heightening both
PLC and crisis readiness. When compared to large organizations, managers in small- and medium-sized
enterprises (SMEs) reported higher PLC but lower crisis readiness, underscoring the challenges faced by small
firms regarding crisis preparation. Crisis readiness was also positively linked to both financial and non-financial
performance. The model tested in this study supports the influence of external and organizational factors on
crisis preparation, as well as subsequent links with firm performance.
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INTRODUCTION
The list of companies filing for bankruptcy during the aftermath of the COVID-19 pandemic is extensive
and includes such notables as Hertz, Stein Mart, Ruby Tuesday, Virgin Atlantic, and Chesapeake
Energy. Their struggles can be attributed to numerous factors, including abrupt changes in buyer
behavior, supply chain interruptions, and government health mandates (Clifford & Wahba, 2020; Shen,
Fu, Pan, Yu, & Chen, 2020). But other firms avoided this fate, and some even prospered. Whether
through strategic foresight or good luck, companies that survive and thrive during a crisis are better
prepared (Bundy, Pfarrer, Short, & Coombs, 2017; Coombs & Holladay, 2006; Crandall, Parnell, &
Spillan, 2020). However, navigating a crisis begins with developing readiness in the organization
before a crisis occurs (Bhaduri, 2019; Bowers, Hall, & Srinivasan, 2017; Gallagher, 2017; Okoli & Watt,
2018).
Developing crisis readiness is more challenging for some organizations than for others, however.
Factors that influence this process include a firm’s external environment, idiosyncratic characteristics
such as organizational size, and perceptions regarding potential threats from a crisis (Joon Mo,
Mortara, & Minshall, 2018; Topaloglu, Koseoglu, & Ondracek, 2013). Understanding how such factors
influence crisis readiness in organizations can help explain why gaps in crisis preparation exist across
firms, and ultimately, what can be done to address them.
It is difficult to suggest how many companies that succumbed to a crisis would have survived if they
had been better prepared. A maturing body of scholarship underscores the importance of crisis
preparation (Bhaduri, 2019; Liu, Shankar, & Yun, 2017; Vouzas & Nizamidou, 2018). This paper focuses
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on two gaps in the literature. First, more research is needed on environmental and organizational
factors that promote or hamper crisis readiness. Second, most published work examining the
performance of firms before and after a crisis focus on profitability, revenues, share prices, and other
financial measures (Dias, Rossi, Silva, de Camargos, & de-Carvalho, 2020; Osiyevskyy, Shirokova, &
Ritala, 2020; Rababah, Al‐Haddad, Sial, Chunmei, & Cherian, 2020; Ryu, Kim, & Ryu, 2019; Shen et al.,
2020). Research addressing the non-financial dimension of performance is also needed (Bouslah,
Kryzanowski, & M’Zali, 2018; Elbanna, Child, & Dayan, 2013; Parnell, 2015).
This study focuses on factors that drive crisis readiness, and ultimately, firm performance. It
addresses two research questions: (1) How do market dynamism, perceived likelihood of a crisis, and
firm size influence crisis readiness? (2) How does crisis readiness influence financial and non-financial
firm performance? It contributes to the crisis management literature by examining how crisis readiness
influences both financial and non-financial dimensions of firm performance. Presenting and evaluating
an integrated model informs future work and provides practical suggestions for managers seeking to
understand the extent to which crisis readiness drives financial and non-financial performance.

LITERATURE REVIEW
A crisis is an unpredictable event that can directly threaten an organization. Examples of crises are
myriad and include natural disasters, cyber-crime, labor disputes, product recalls, and lawsuits
emanating from discrimination, sexual harassment, and whistleblowers. Accelerated by increased
technology and the increasingly global nature of business activity, the frequency and diversity of crises
have increased in recent years (Boin, 2019; Bundy et al., 2017; Coleman, 2004; Greyser, 2009;
Jakubanecs, Supphellen, & Helgeson, 2018; Lalonde, 2007; Robert & Lajtha, 2002). Many crisis events
require quick, decisive action, the ramifications of which can dramatically affect a firm’s reputation,
financial performance, and even survival (Bundy et al., 2017; Coombs & Holladay, 2006).
Effective crisis management requires that action be taken before, during, and after a crisis event.
Avoidable crises should be averted, and others should be managed to mitigate their adverse effects
on the firm. Toward this end, organizations should develop crisis management capabilities and crisis
management plans (CMPs) before a crisis occurs (Cirka & Corrigall, 2010; Hunter, Van Wassenhove, &
Besiou, 2016; Jacques, 2010). Organizations with established crisis management teams (CMTs) and
CMPs tend to exhibit a greater awareness of and concern for possible crises (Crandall et al., 2020).
CMTs develop worst-case scenarios and standard operating procedures (SOPs) to anticipate crises and
to provide guidance to organizational members when a crisis strikes. Moreover, all employees should
be aware of their specific responsibilities and should be empowered appropriately to manage a crisis
in their departments (Areiqut & Zamil, 2011).
Developing crisis readiness in a firm prepares its members to address a crisis proactively and
navigate it effectively (Okoli & Watt, 2018). Examples underscoring the importance of crisis readiness
are legion. The following scenario illustrates the link between strategic management and crisis
management, as well as the specific challenges associated with crisis readiness and decision-making.
Overbooking has been widely successful in the airline industry, as fewer empty seats translate into
higher revenues, lower per-seat costs, and lower fares (Klophaus & Pölt, 2006; Parnell & Crandall,
2017). The practice is readily justified because many ticketed passengers arrive in time to board their
flights anyway (Carey, 2017). Between 2010 and 2019, the number of passengers denied boarding
ranged from 352 to 746 annually, 0.079% of the total for the ten-year period. Most of the denials were
voluntary. The number of passengers removed involuntarily ranged from 11 to 59 each year, only
0.006% of the total for the same period (U.S. Department of Transportation, 2020).
Overbooking might make strategic sense, but each boarding denial represents a stressful event
with the potential to become a crisis. United Airlines experienced a worst-case scenario on April 9,
__________________________________________________
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2017, when ticketed passenger Dr. David Dao was forcibly removed from a United flight. When Dr.
Dao’s removal was recorded on a smartphone and posted on social media, a boarding denial had
rapidly become a significant and costly crisis for the firm (Carey, 2017). Crisis readiness reflects an
organization’s ability to evaluate the potential effects of a strategic decision such as overbooking and
prepare for negative scenarios that can occur as a result. While United Airlines had established
procedures to manage boarding denials, the level of crisis readiness in the organization—specifically,
the training and preparation afforded the United employees who dealt with Dr. Dao directly—was
insufficient.
The United Airlines example illustrates how a firm’s approach to strategic planning can make an
organization more or less susceptible to a crisis. However, firms must also proactively develop crisis
readiness (Crandall et al., 2020). Managers can take important steps to help their organizations
prepare for a crisis that cannot be avoided (Bhaduri, 2019; Spector, 2019).
Crisis readiness is a sub-area of the broader discipline of crisis management and includes both signal
detection and preparation/prevention phases (Bundy et al., 2017; Pearson & Mitroff, 1993). An
organization’s crisis readiness defines its ability to address crisis events when they occur. Crisis
readiness should be distinguished from a manager’s perceptions about the likelihood of a crisis (PLC).
Also referred to as crisis concern, PLC reflects the extent to which managers worry about the
likelihood of crisis events and the potential impacts they might have on the organization (Pearson &
Mitroff, 1993).
Rousaki and Alcott (2007) developed scales to measure crisis readiness and the perceived likelihood
of a crisis (PLC). Other scholars (e.g., Avery & Park, 2019; Elsubbaugh, Fildes, & Rose, 2004; Enander,
Hede, & Lajksjö, 2015; Hilliard, Scott‐Halsell, & Palakurthi, 2011; Jin, 2010; Labaš, 2017; Olofsson, 2011;
Selart, Johansen, & Nesse, 2013) have used the term “crisis preparation” within a similar context. Crisis
preparation and crisis readiness are related constructs. Indeed, preparing an organization for a crisis
enhances its readiness, but other factors (e.g., access to financial resources) are also important.
Nonetheless, scholarship on the merits of crisis preparation helps inform a broader understanding of
crisis readiness. Hence, these terms are used interchangeably in this paper.
Crisis readiness can be viewed from an internal perspective (Bundy et al., 2017). Research on highreliability organizations suggests that firms can modify culture, structure, and design to manage
unexpected events by preventing breakdowns that can facilitate a crisis (Ashford & Anand, 2003;
Greve, Palmer, & Pozner, 2010). A firm’s culture can be tolerant of executive misconduct that can lay
the groundwork for a crisis (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2006).
Crisis readiness can also be viewed from an external perspective (Bundy et al., 2017). Positive
stakeholder relationships can increase information exchange and cooperation between managers
across firms, helping firms avoid crises (Kahn, Barton, & Fellows, 2013; Ulmer, Sellnow, & Seeger, 2011).
In a similar vein, negative stakeholder relationships can prompt members of an organization to engage
in unethical or illegal behavior to meet stakeholder expectations or to take necessary action to
retaliate against a stakeholder (Greve et al., 2010). Uncertainties associated with market dynamism—
perceived instability and constant change in markets in which the firm competes (Rodrigo-Alarcón,
García-Villaverde, Parra-Requena, & Ruiz-Ortega, 2017; Wu & Nguyen, 2019; Zehir & Balak, 2018)—can
also impact perceptions about crisis risk (Coombs & Laufer, 2018; Watson, Finn, & Wadhwa, 2017).

HYPOTHESES
This paper tests five sets of hypotheses, each of which is tested as part of a composite model linking
environmental and organizational factors to crisis readiness, and ultimately to firm performance.
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MARKET DYNAMISM AND PERFORMANCE
Market dynamism reflects the degree of environmental volatility and unpredictability that
organizations encounter (Wu & Nguyen, 2019; Zehir & Balak, 2018). It propagates market asymmetry
and creates strategic opportunities for managers to distinguish their firms from rivals, thereby
potentially increasing firm performance. (H. Liu & H. Wei, 2015; Zhang, 2008). Market dynamism can
also be an essential precursor to organizational development by facilitating strategic change (Y. Liu &
H. Wei, 2015). Indeed, firms can leverage the market uncertainty associated with dynamic markets by
developing new products, entering new markets, integrating supply chains, or taking other strategic
actions (Xu, Li, Sun, & Zhao, 2012). A broad link between market dynamism and firm performance is
largely consistent with the resource-based view of the firm, as it underscores the notion of subjective
value and the unique positions from which organizations address environment uncertainty (Barney,
2014; Parnell, 2018).
Increased market dynamism creates opportunities for innovation and high firm performance
(Antoncic & Hisrich, 2001; Atuahene-Gima, Li, & De Luca, 2006; Rodrigo-Alarcón et al., 2017).
Specifically, dynamic markets encourage innovation, which can increase returns in highly competitive
markets (Tsai & Yang, 2013). Previous research supports a substantial nexus between dynamism and
firm performance (Crandall et al., 2020; Zehir & Balak, 2018).
H1a: Market dynamism will be positively associated with financial performance.
H1b: Market dynamism will be positively associated with non-financial performance.
MARKET DYNAMISM, PERCEIVED LIKELIHOOD OF A CRISIS AND CRISIS READINESS
Crisis decision-making is complex and challenging because leaders must make quick decisions amidst
environments of stress, high uncertainty, and turbulence (de Waard, Volberda, & Soeters, 2012; Kantur
& Iseri-Say, 2012). Indeed, uncertainty often stokes anxiety (Gottlieb, Weiss, & Chapman, 2007;
Swamidass & Newell, 1987). In this respect, perceived environmental uncertainty can heighten
awareness of and concern about potential adverse events (Coombs & Laufer, 2018; Jauch & Kraft,
1986; Milliken, 1987; Parnell, 2018; Watson et al., 2017). Indeed, environmental change is inherent in
dynamic markets (Antonacopoulou & Sheaffer, 2014; Hunter et al., 2016; Stern, 2013). Higher levels of
uncertainty characterize such markets. Scholars have highlighted the role of external influences such
as environmental uncertainty on managerial decision-making (Elbanna et al., 2013; Parnell, 2018).
Hence, one would expect managers in such environments to report higher levels of both crisis concern
and crisis readiness.
H2: Market dynamism will be positively associated with a manager’s perceived likelihood of a crisis.
H3: Market dynamism will be positively associated with crisis readiness.
PERCEIVED LIKELIHOOD OF A CRISIS AND CRISIS READINESS
Crisis concern tends to spark preparation and readiness, as managers aware of current or prospective
organizational problems are more likely to take appropriate measures to address them. Such a link is
intuitive, as some level of knowledge about a potential problem is generally required before individuals
act. Although awareness does not guarantee a positive response, research supports the notion that
management action tends to increase when the awareness of a crisis or another concern also rises
(Bruce & Nowlin, 2011; Chew Abdullah & Khairuddin, 2013; Tanifuji, 2000; Wong, 2019).
__________________________________________________
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There are instances when crisis concern might not enhance crisis readiness or where crisis readiness
could drive crisis concern (Parnell, Koseoglu, & Spillan, 2010; Rousaki & Alcott, 2007). For example,
managers could report high crisis concern after considerable crisis preparation has already occurred
because preparation can raise crisis awareness, particularly among managers who would otherwise
not be concerned. Nonetheless, previous work suggests a strong link between crisis concern and
action designed to enhance crisis response (Bundy et al., 2017; Crandall et al., 2020; Liu et al., 2017).
Hence, a positive link between PLC and crisis readiness is anticipated in this study.
H4: The perceived likelihood of a crisis will be positively associated with crisis readiness.
FIRM SIZE AND CRISIS READINESS
Effective crisis planning requires that organizations commit the appropriate time, energy, and other
resources (Parnell, 2015). Many large organizations employ individuals assigned to specific crisis
management activities and work with consultants to integrate advanced crisis assessment and
training (Bhaduri, 2019; Nicolau, 2015; Watson et al., 2017). Because of inadequate planning and
resource constraints, smaller organizations often struggle to survive when a crisis strikes. There is less
scholarly work on crisis planning in SMEs, with exceptions in crisis-prone industries such as hospitality
and tourism (Herbane, 2013; Morakabati, Page, & Fletcher, 2017; Racherla & Clark, 2009; Sawalha,
Jraisat, & Al-Quduh, 2013).
In addition, SMEs often lack the information necessary to anticipate and preclude a crisis, as well
as the resources required to manage one. Limited economies of scale place SMEs at a relative
disadvantage because they must spread the costs associated with crisis readiness over fewer units of
production (Doern, 2016; Kurschus, Sarapovas, & Pilinkiene, 2017; Nicolau, 2015; Vargo & Seville, 2011;
Vouzas & Nizamidou, 2018). Hence, managers with a general awareness of crisis challenges associated
with smaller firms will likely report both a greater concern about prospective crises in their
organizations and a reduced level of crisis readiness.
H5a: Managers in SMEs will report a higher PLC than will managers in large firms.
H5b: Managers in SMEs will report a lower level of crisis readiness than will managers in large firms.
CRISIS READINESS AND FIRM PERFORMANCE
Crisis readiness can enhance financial performance in two primary ways. First, when a firm’s managers
anticipate and prepare for crisis events, they can reduce the likelihood that one will occur, thereby
eliminating the loss a crisis can bring to bear. Second, even when a crisis cannot be avoided, CMTs and
CMPs can help a firm manage it and reduce the negative financial impact on the organization. Extant
research supports a broad link between crisis preparation and financial outcomes across industries
(Antonacopoulou & Sheaffer, 2014; Crandall et al., 2020; Elsubbaugh et al., 2004).
Intuitively, the positive link between crisis readiness and financial performance could extend to the
non-financial arena (Bouslah et al., 2018). Conceptual support for such a link emanates from
stakeholder theory, which emphasizes the impacts of firm action on various outcomes (Hillman &
Keim, 2001). A stakeholder perspective highlights non-financial performance measures alongside the
traditional concerns of profitability, firm growth, and financial returns to owners. Moreover, some
crisis events affect non-financial performance directly. For example, a social media crisis can
immediately damage a firm's reputation and customer goodwill, even if the financial implications are
minimized or cannot be readily calculated (Cheng, 2018; Greyser, 2009; Watson & Rodrigues, 2018;
__________________________________________________
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Zhang & Borden, 2017). Hence, crisis readiness should drive both financial and non-financial
performance.
H6a: Crisis readiness will be positively associated with financial performance.
H6b: Crisis readiness will be positively associated with non-financial performance.

METHODOLOGY
Data were collected via a survey administered online through Cint’s online insight exchange platform.
Surveys were sent to and completed by full-time, practicing managers in the United States; part-time
managers and non-managers were excluded. From an initial population of approximately 1,400
qualified potential respondents, 442 surveys were completed. Multiple management levels,
experiential backgrounds, industry affiliations, and organization sizes were represented, including
individuals with a wide range of organizational and management experience (see table 1). Lower level
and middle managers were included in the analysis, as they have played a more significant role in
recent years in both strategy formulation and execution (Balogun & Johnson, 2004; Raes, Heijltjes,
Glunk, & Roe, 2011).
Small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) were defined as organizations with at least ten but no
more than 250 employees. Micro-businesses—organizations with fewer than ten employees—were
excluded from the analysis. Hence, non-SMEs in the study included only organizations with more than
250 employees. SME status was measured by a dichotomous dummy variable.
Previously validated scales were employed to the extent feasible. The crisis readiness scale was
adapted from Rousaki and Alcott (2007), who developed the only existing published scale available to
measure the construct. The PLC scale was based on their work but modified for the current study.
The market dynamism scale was adopted from Junghan and Lakshmanan (2015). This scale was
utilized because of its emphasis on customers (e.g., interest in new products and price sensitivity) and
its ease of application to firms in various manufacturing and service industries.
Firm performance was measured via eight items adapted from prior studies (Hult, Hurley, & Knight,
2004; Tang, Tang, Marino, Zhang, & Li, 2008; Tsai & Yang, 2013; Zahra & Garvis, 2000) and dissected
into financial and non-financial dimensions. Self-reported performance measures were used because
of the limited access to financial data for privately held firms, the positive correlation between
perceived and objective performance measures (Lau & Ngo, 2001; Menguc & Auh, 2006), and the
preference for relative performance measures when assessing organizations across industries. Sevenpoint Likert scales (e.g., 1=strongly disagree, 4=neither disagree nor agree, 7=strongly agree) were
employed.
Each response was scrutinized for evidence of straightlining, excessive missing data, and other
concerns. Individuals completing the survey in less than 2.5 seconds per question were eliminated. This
conservative approach to cleaning the data eliminated 141 cases, resulting in 301 usable responses.
The hypotheses were tested via SmartPLS (version 3) software. SmartPLS employs a partial least
squares (PLS) algorithm to structural equation modeling (SEM). Whereas covariance-based SEM seeks
to minimize unexplained variance, PLS-SEM seeks to maximize explained variance. SmartPLS was used
because of its ability to predict target variables (e.g., crisis readiness and firm performance) (Hair,
Risher, Sarstedt, & Ringle, 2019; Hair, Sarstedt, Ringle, & Gudergan, 2018).
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Table 1. Sample Demographics
n

%

Management Level
Lower
Middle
Upper

26
175
100

8.6
58.1
33.2

Functional Background
Accounting/Finance
General Management/HR
Law
Marketing/Sales
Production/Engineering
Information Technology
Other
(missing)

57
80
9
30
73
25
26
2

18.9
26.6
3.0
10.0
24.3
8.3
8.0
0.7

Gender
Male
Female
(missing)

155
143
3

51.5
47.5
1.0

Industry
Manufacturing
Hospitality
Healthcare
Services
Other
(missing)

82
22
30
104
62
1

27.2
7.3
10.0
34.6
20.6
0.3

Firm Size
Micro (-10 employees)
Small (11-50 employees)
Medium (51-250 employees)
Large (251+ employees)

0
55
104
142

0.0
18.3
34.6
47.2

FINDINGS
The hypotheses and model were assessed systematically (Hair et al., 2019). Scales were evaluated for
reliability and validity with the consistent partial least squares (PLSc) algorithm (see tables 2 & 3).
Three of the market dynamism items produced loadings below 0.700 and were eliminated in a
stepwise fashion. All eight of the crisis readiness items loaded above 0.700 and were retained. The
third item in the PLC scale produced a loading of 0.676, slightly below the target minimum of 0.700. It
was retained because latent constructs should include at least three measures and loadings tend to
be lower in three-item scales. Factor-level variance inflation factor (VIF) scores were less than 3.3 in all
instances (see table 4), suggesting that the model is free from common method bias (Kock, 2015).
The first and second items in the financial performance scale produced loadings of 0.695 and 0.614,
respectively. The first item in the non-financial performance scale (i.e., customer satisfaction and
loyalty) produced a loading of 0.534. It is not uncommon for correlations among performance
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measures to fall short of established thresholds, so these items were retained (Chow & Van Der Stede,
2006; Venkatraman & Ramanujam, 1986).
Table 2. Factor Loadings and Collinearity Statistics
Factor
Variable
Loading
VIF

Item Wording

Crisis Readiness
CR1
CR2
CR3

0.745
0.709
0.712

1.830
2.270
2.311

CR4

0.759

2.170

CR5

0.770

2.028

CR6

0.773

2.287

CR7

0.714

1.802

CR8

0.783

2.195

Financial Performance
FP1
FP2
FP3
FP4

0.695
0.614
0.869
0.814

1.642
2.079
2.089
1.820

Return on assets (ROA)
Growth in revenue/sales
Growth in market share
Growth in stock price and investor returns

Market Dynamism
MD1

0.764

1.942

MD2

0.780

1.984

MD3

0.837

1.932

Our customers look for new products all the time
Sometimes customers are price-sensitive, other
times not
We see demand for our products and services
from customers who have never bought them
before

Non-financial
Performance
NFP1
NFP2
NFP3

0.534
0.817
0.856

1.687
2.162
1.564

PLC1

0.789

1.770

PLC2

0.856

1.950

PLC3

0.676

1.774

Perceived Likelihood of a
Crisis

Accessibility to crisis management resources
Adequate budget to manage a crisis
Adequate crisis management plan (CMP)
I am well informed about crisis response
resource/tools
Crisis management viewed as an organizational
goal
Training to manage a crisis
Rewards employees for detecting and reporting
crisis signs
Key employees well informed about crisis response
resource and tools

Customer satisfaction and loyalty
Employee satisfaction and loyalty
Development of capabilities critical to firm success

High likelihood of a crisis associated with
customers
High likelihood of a crisis associated with
employees
High likelihood of a crisis associated with facilities
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Table 3. Scale Properties
Construct
Crisis Readiness
Financial Performance
Market Dynamism
Non-Financial Performance
PLC

Cronbach’s
Alpha
0.909
0.841
0.837
0.787
0.818

rho_A
0.910
0.853
0.838
0.821
0.829

Average
Variance
Explained
0.557
0.569
0.631
0.562
0.604

Composite
Reliability
0.909
0.839
0.837
0.787
0.819

Table 4. Factor-Level VIF Scores
Variable
Market Dynamism
Crisis Readiness
PLC
Financial Performance
Non-Financial Performance
SME

Crisis
Financial
Market
Readiness
Perf.
Dynamism
1.576
1.687
1.819
1.664
1.458
1.246
2.422
2.534
2.239
2.648
2.699
2.435
1.054
1.034
1.005

Non-Fin.
Perf.
PLC
1.712
1.668
1.969
1.909
1.482
1.484
1.390
1.553
1.055
1.056

Table 5. Fornell-Larcker Matrix
Variable
Crisis Readiness
Financial Performance
Market Dynamism
Non-Financial
Performance
PLC
SME

Crisis
Readiness
0.746
0.460
0.574

Financial
Perf.

Market
Dynamism

0.755
0.498

0.794

0.528

0.771

0.536

0.750

0.531
-0.060

0.256
-0.032

0.406
-0.013

0.290
-0.015

Table 6. Heterotrait-Monotrait (HTMT) Ratio
Crisis
Variable
Readiness
Crisis Readiness
Financial Performance
0.460
Market Dynamism
0.574
Non-Financial
0.522
Performance
PLC
0.528
SME
0.070

Financial
Perf.

Non-Fin.
Perf.

Market
Dynamism

PLC

0.777
0.156

Non-Fin.
Perf.

SME

1.000

PLC

0.491
0.792

0.531

0.252
0.033

0.409
0.013
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Table 7. Tests of Hypotheses
Original
Hypothesis
Sample
H1a: Market Dyn. >
0.349
Fin. Perf.
H1b: Market Dyn. >
0.347
Non-Fin. Perf.
H2: Market Dyn. >
0.409
PLC
H3: Market Dyn. >
0.419
Crisis Readiness
H4: PLC > Crisis
0.379
Readiness
H5a: SME > PLC
0.161
H5b: SME > Crisis
-0.113
Readiness
H6a: Crisis Read. >
0.260
Fin. Perf.
H6b: Crisis Read. >
0.329
Non-Fin. Perf.

American Business Review 24(1)

Sample
Mean

Std. Dev.

t-stat.

p-value

Support

f2
value

0.348

0.098

3.543

0.000*

yes

0.116

0.345

0.098

3.540

0.000*

yes

0.113

0.411

0.078

5.261

0.000*

yes

0.207

0.419

0.084

4.984

0.000*

yes

0.263

0.381

0.083

4.559

0.000*

yes

0.210

0.160

0.058

2.786

0.005*

yes

0.032

-0.111

0.049

2.305

0.021*

yes

0.023

0.266

0.081

3.215

0.001*

yes

0.064

0.334

0.095

3.452

0.001*

yes

0.113

* significant at .05 level

Table 8. Hypothesized Model Indirect Effects
Indirect Effect
Sample
Mkt. Dyn. > Crisis Read. > Fin. Perf.
0.109
Mkt. Dyn. > Crisis Read. > Non-Fin. Perf. 0.138
Mkt. Dyn. > PLC > Crisis Read.
0.155
Mkt. Dyn. > PLC > Crisis Read. > Fin.
0.040
Perf.
Mkt. Dyn. > PLC > Crisis Read. > Non0.051
Fin. Perf.
PLC > Crisis Read. > Fin. Perf.
0.099
PLC > Crisis Read. > Non-Fin. Perf.
0.125
SME > Crisis Read. > Fin. Perf.
-0.029
SME > Crisis Read. > Non-Fin. Perf.
-0.037
SME > PLC > Crisis Read.
0.061
SME > PLC > Crisis Read. > Fin. Perf.
0.016
SME > PLC > Crisis Read. > Non-Fin.
0.020
Perf.

Mean
0.112
0.141
0.158

Dev.
0.044
0.051
0.049

t-stat.
2.491
2.710
3.149

p-value
0.013*
0.007*
0.002*

0.043

0.020

2.035

0.042*

0.053

0.023

2.211

0.027*

0.101
0.128
-0.029
-0.037
0.059
0.016

0.039
0.047
0.016
0.019
0.023
0.008

2.538
2.652
1.866
1.945
2.629
1.897

0.011*
0.008*
0.062
0.052
0.009*
0.058

0.020

0.010

1.977

0.048*

* significant at .05 level

Coefficient alphas exceeded 0.800, composite alphas exceeded 0.800, and average variance
explained (AVE) exceeded 0.500 for all constructs (see table 3). The Fornell-Larcker and hererotraitmonotrait (HTMT) criteria suggest discriminant validity in all instances (see tables 5-6). Variance
inflation factor (VIF) scores were below three for all items, suggesting that collinearity was not a
significant concern. These results reinforce earlier decisions to retain several items with marginal
loadings.
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Hypotheses were tested by consistent bootstrapping. Each hypothesis was supported, as depicted
in table 7 and figure 1. The indirect effects in the hypothesized model were assessed as well (see table
8). Results support some, but not all, mediated relationships in the model.
Although the bootstrapping results support the proposed path model, it is also important to
evaluate the practical significance of each relationship. Effect sizes were assessed and interpreted
following Cohen’s benchmarks of 0.02 (small), 0.15 (moderate), and 0.35 (large) (Hair, Sarstedt, Pieper,
& Ringle, 2012). The influence of firm size (SME) on PLC and crisis readiness were the smallest, 0.023
and 0.032, respectively. The effects of market dynamism on PLC (0.207) and crisis readiness (0.263)
were moderate, as was PLC's effect on crisis readiness (0.210).

Figure 1. Tests of Hypotheses
R2 and Q2 values are provided in table 9. Crisis readiness produced the highest R2 value (0.448). The
R2 value for non-financial performance (0.360) was higher than for financial performance (0.294).
Q2 values were calculated with a blindfolding test with seven iterations (see table 8). Scores ranged
from 0.091 to 0.205, suggesting small predictive relevance for each of the four dependent variables in
the model.
The PLSpredict algorithm with ten folds and ten repetitions was applied to provide an out-ofsample evaluation of the predictive model. RMSE calculations were lower for the PLS model than for
the linear model (LM) in all but one instance (PLC3), supporting predictive power for the tested model
(see table 10).
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Table 9. R2 and Q2 Values
R2 value
0.448
0.294
0.360
0.192

Variable
Crisis Readiness
Financial Performance
Non-Financial Performance
PLC

Q2 value
0.205
0.138
0.173
0.091

Table 10. PLSpredict Results
Item
oif1
oif2
oif3
oif4
oif5
oif6
oif7
oif8
perform1
perform2
perform3
perform4
perform6
perform7
perform8
plc1
plc2
plc3

PLS RMSE
1.222
1.182
1.138
1.259
1.239
1.256
1.264
1.187
1.160
1.188
1.170
1.159
1.186
1.285
1.042
1.517
1.466
1.550

PLS
Q _predict
0.140
0.144
0.140
0.136
0.179
0.124
0.148
0.156
0.111
0.033
0.142
0.149
0.058
0.134
0.188
0.094
0.089
0.082

Table 11. Saturated Model
Hyothesis Link
H1a: Mkt. Dyn. > Fin. Perf.
H1b: Mkt. Dyn. > Non-Fin. Perf.
H2a: Mkt. Dyn. > PLC
H2b: Mkt. Dyn. > Crisis Readiness
H3: PLC > Crisis Readiness
H4a: SME > PLC
H4b: SME > Crisis Readiness
H5a: Crisis Read. > Fin. Perf.
H5b: Crisis Read. > Non-Fin. Perf.
n/a: PLC > Fin. Perf.
n/a: PLC > Non-Fin. Perf.
n/a: SME > Fin. Perf.
n/a: SME > Non-Fin. Perf.

2

Sample
0.354
0.352
0.408
0.419
0.379
0.161
-0.113
0.274
0.349
-0.032
-0.041
-0.006
0.016

LM RMSE
1.231
1.187
1.133
1.272
1.246
1.268
1.274
1.194
1.173
1.193
1.179
1.161
1.198
1.299
1.048
1.526
1.473
1.557

Mean
0.353
0.348
0.411
0.420
0.380
0.161
-0.111
0.282
0.359
-0.034
-0.043
-0.005
0.018

* significant at .05 level
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Dev.
0.099
0.100
0.078
0.084
0.081
0.059
0.049
0.097
0.106
0.089
0.077
0.058
0.057

LM
Q _predict
0.128
0.137
0.149
0.118
0.171
0.107
0.135
0.146
0.090
0.024
0.129
0.146
0.038
0.115
0.178
0.083
0.081
0.074
2

t-stat.
3.558
3.553
5.264
5.003
4.688
2.749
2.300
2.833
3.279
0.359
0.530
0.104
0.286

Change in
RMSE
-0.009
-0.005
0.005
-0.013
-0.007
-0.012
-0.010
-0.007
-0.013
-0.005
-0.009
-0.002
-0.012
-0.014
-0.006
-0.009
-0.007
-0.007

p-value
0.000*
0.000*
0.000*
0.000*
0.000*
0.006*
0.021*
0.005*
0.001*
0.719
0.596
0.917
0.775

value
0.116
0.127
0.206
0.264
0.211
0.032
0.023
0.059
0.105
0.001
0.002
0.000
0.000
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A model including each of the hypothesized links was compared to a saturated model, but only the
hypothesized links were supported in the latter (see table 11). The Bayesian information criteria (BIC)
calculations for financial and non-financial performance were lower in the hypothesized model than in
the saturated model, -88.522 and -118.059 versus -77.461 and -107.198, respectively, thereby supporting
the hypothesized model.

DISCUSSION
An importance-performance map analysis (IPMA) assessed the practical implications of the tested
model. Values in the first four columns in table 12 represent the importance values for each of the four
target constructs in the model. Values in the final column represent performance values for each
construct. The IPMA maps are presented later in this section.
The uncertainty inherent in dynamic markets appears to raise crisis concerns and readiness while
also promoting firm performance. The IPMA results presented in figure 2 identified market dynamism
as the most important driver of both financial and non-financial performance. On the surface,
organizations appear to have no control over market dynamism, but this is not entirely true. Firms
ultimately choose the markets in which they compete (Parnell, Lester, Zhang, & Köseoglu, 2012; Zajac
& Shortell, 1989).

Figure 2. IPMA Results: Financial Performance
Table 12. IPMA Results: Importance and Performance Values
Crisis
Financial
Target Construct
Readiness
Perf.
Crisis Readiness
0.258
Financial Performance
Market Dynamism
0.446
0.372
Non-Fin. Performance
PLC
0.263
0.068
SME
-0.105
-0.207
__________________________________________________
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Non-Fin.
Perf.
0.318

PLC

0.403

0.398

0.084
-0.033

0.394

Performance
Value
72.968
69.157
70.848
73.403
67.731
52.824
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The findings reinforce the idea that firms often benefit from the turbulence and uncertainty
inherent in dynamic markets. In contrast, when managers pursue “safety” in less dynamic sectors,
they can limit the performance possibilities.

Figure 3. IPMA Results: Non-Financial Performance

Figure 4. IPMA Results: Crisis Readiness
Crisis readiness was the second-most important driver of both financial and non-financial
performance, as depicted in figure 3. Previous studies reported similar links, but they only assessed
the financial dimension of performance (Antonacopoulou & Sheaffer, 2014; Elsubbaugh et al., 2004).
However, the link between crisis readiness and non-financial performance produced higher R2 and Q2
values than the link between crisis readiness and financial performance. This distinction suggests that
crisis readiness could have an underappreciated positive influence on customers, employees, and
other stakeholders.
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Figure 5. IPMA Results: Perceived Likelihood of a Crisis (PLC)

Figure 6. IPMA Results for Indicators: Perceived Likelihood of a Crisis (PLC)
The investments required to improve crisis readiness vary across organizations, but forming a CMT,
developing a CMP, and taking other basic measures can provide clear performance benefits.
Nonetheless, crisis readiness is relatively more expensive in SMEs because preparation costs must be
allocated to fewer units of production (Kurschus et al., 2017; Vargo & Seville, 2011). This challenge is
not only intuitive but is also supported by the findings presented herein.
Market dynamism was also the most important driver of crisis readiness and PLC, as depicted in
figures 4 and 5. Nonetheless, the strong link between PLC and crisis readiness reinforces the intuitive
notion and previous work suggesting that management awareness of and expectations about
prospective crisis events drives efforts to prepare for those events (Bruce & Nowlin, 2011; Chew
Abdullah & Khairuddin, 2013; Tanifuji, 2000; Wong, 2019).
Given that PLC also mediated the market dynamism-crisis readiness relationship (see table 7), many
firms appear to develop crisis readiness capabilities because they see a crisis as a viable threat,
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particularly in the markets in which they operate. This link also suggests that managers in less dynamic
markets underestimate and do not prepare sufficiently for crises in their organizations. Firms in
dynamic markets might be more likely to experience a crisis, but all organizations are susceptible and
should prepare accordingly (Ali & Al-Aali, 2016; Bundy et al., 2017).
The PLC-crisis readiness nexus among SMEs depicted in figure 5 is intriguing. Direct and indirect
results suggest that PLC partially mediates the link between SME status and crisis readiness, but that
SME status negatively influences crisis readiness directly. Hence, managers in SMEs expressed greater
concern about prospective crises in their organizations while also reporting a lower degree of crisis
readiness, reinforcing the resource dependence of crisis preparation efforts. As firms grow, their
managers tend to become better informed about potential crises and better equipped to prepare for
them. Although the effect sizes for the SME links were small, SMEs appear to experience the greatest
crisis vulnerability.
IPMA maps the indicators of each construct are summarized in table 11. The three items in the
market dynamism scale were the most important indicators in the assessments with financial
performance, non-financial performance, and crisis readiness as target constructs. As figure 6
illustrates, when PLC was evaluated as a target variable, SME was the most important, but also the
poorest performing indicator.

MANAGEMENT IMPLICATIONS
The link between PLC and crisis readiness suggests that crisis training should begin with crisis
awareness. Managers who do not anticipate a crisis are less likely to prepare for one (Ali & Al-Aali,
2016; Nizamidou, Vouzas, & Gotzamani, 2019). Wide-ranging reports of crises in the business press
should enhance awareness in a broad sense, but overexposure can lead some managers to associated
crisis events with other organizations and think that such events are less likely to occur at their
organizations (Caponecchia, 2010; Parnell & Dent, 2009). The notion that “it can’t happen to us” is
shortsighted.
The results presented herein underscore the need for more effective crisis planning among SMEs.
Managers in SMEs appear to anticipate crises but are not comfortable with their overall level of
preparation. Innovative SMEs tend to outperform their rivals in dynamic markets (Kraus, Rigtering,
Hughes, & Hosman, 2012), but the inherent uncertainty can also make SMEs more prone to crises
(Kurschus et al., 2017; Vargo & Seville, 2011). The strategic challenges faced by SMEs and large firms
can differ. Hence, crisis training for SMEs is not only vital but should account for challenges unique to
smaller organizations.
Effective crisis planning appears to enhance both financial and non-financial performance.
Managers often resist crisis planning because they do not see a link between the resources required
and firm performance. There is growing evidence that such resource commitments are worthwhile
(Helm & Tolsdorf, 2013; Liu et al., 2017; Mansor & KaderAli, 2017).
The positive link between crisis planning and firm performance depicted herein suggests that
managers should be more proactive crisis planners. However, this is not always the case. Advocates
of crisis awareness and planning often find themselves in a precarious position because they champion
preparation for specific events that are unlikely to occur. If an organization does not experience a
crisis—at least for a time—crisis preparation might be deemed unnecessary. However, the results can
be costly or even catastrophic when a firm does not prepare for a crisis (Parnell & Crandall, 2017). In
this respect, those who promote crisis planning may be the unsung heroes in organizations.
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CONCLUSIONS, LIMITATIONS, AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
Two interrelated limitations of this study have been identified. First, this study assessed managers in
multiple industries. Industry-specific factors influence strategic action and performance. Second, selftyping scales were employed to assess financial and non-financial performance (Ramanujam &
Venkatraman, 1987; Venkatraman & Ramanujam, 1986). This approach is especially appropriate for
evaluating performance with cross-industry samples because it considers performance relative to
competitors instead of relying on objective performance data that is driven in part by industry factors
(McGahan & Porter, 1997). Nonetheless, quantitative measures provide a more traditional and useful
lens for performance assessment, which can also reduce the influence of common method variance
(Chang, Van Witteloostuijn, & Eden, 2010; Lindell & Whitney, 2001; Podasakoff, MacKenzie, Lee, &
Podsakoff, 2003).
Several viable research directions have been identified. First, the results presented in this study are
based on a sample of US firms and include a limited number of constructs. Additional scholarship on
global crisis management is warranted (Coombs & Laufer, 2018) and would help evaluate the
appropriateness of the model presented herein in other nations. Specifically, research that integrates
the role of innovation, particularly as a mediator in the market dynamism-firm performance
relationship, is germane. Previous work supports a link (Antoncic & Hisrich, 2001; Atuahene-Gima et
al., 2006; Parnell, 2015; Rodrigo-Alarcón et al., 2017), but the distinctions between financial and nonfinancial performance are not clear. Consideration of crisis self-efficacy would be appropriate as well
(Park & Avery, 2019).
Second, the SME links to PLC and crisis readiness were significant in the present study, but the
effect sizes were small. Additional work is necessary to delineate the influence of firm size on the
model. Other measures of size (e.g., revenues) may contribute to a more thorough explanation.
Third, this study examines links between crisis readiness and current performance. Future work
should consider the extent to which increasing crisis readiness benefits organizations over the long
term. This distinction is important, as several scholars have delineated. For example, recent research
on the long-term implications of product recalls suggests that negative effects linger over time, while
negative long-term effects were mitigated by voluntary recalls and effective crisis communication (Liu
et al., 2017; Mansor & KaderAli, 2017). Such findings suggest that the short-term performance influence
of crisis readiness and response approaches might not translate into a long-term impact.
The short- and long-term effects associated with crisis preparation can influence commitment to
the process. From a rational perspective, managers discount the value of future benefits associated
with an action. This phenomenon can present a severe challenge for managers seeking to raise crisis
awareness in an organization and acquire the resources necessary to engage in crisis preparation
(Parnell & Crandall, 2016). Hence, additional work that distinguished between short- and long-term
impacts is germane.
Fourth, this study treats PLC and crisis readiness as reflective constructs. While item wording and
loadings support reflective conceptualizations, the development of formative measures could lend
insight. For example, PLC assesses three broad crisis categories, not specific crises. Similarly, crisis
readiness assesses the preparation for crises in general, not the preparation for specific crises.
Reorienting these scales to include a wide variety of potential crises events could produce rich,
formative measures that more accurately explain how and why some organizations might be
concerned about and better prepared for some crises, but not others (Bundy et al., 2017; Crandall et
al., 2020).
Finally, a refinement of the performance measures is germane. Specifically, the similarity in results
for both financial and non-financial performance raises questions about the value of assessing each
performance dimension as a different construct. The reliability and validity measures reported herein
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support the existence of two constructs and modest differences in the model (e.g., higher R2 and Q2
values for non-financial performance). Still, the results did not suggest any practical differences.
Bayesian information criteria (BIC) calculations for a model with a composite performance measure
were lower in the hypothesized model (-123.521) than in the saturated model (-117.826), lending
support to a more parsimonious, unidimensional conceptualization of firm performance. Goodnessof-fit comparisons between competing models with one and two dimensions of performance were
inconclusive and have limited usefulness when comparing PLS models (Henseler & Sarstedt, 2013).
This challenge could be resolved by reconsidering the construction of financial and non-financial
performance measures. Like PLC and crisis readiness, this study also treats financial and non-financial
firm performance as reflective constructs. Including multiple measures in each construct strengthens
the analysis, and results from the reliability assessments (see table 3) support this approach. However,
one item in the financial performance scale and two items in the non-financial performance scale
loaded below 0.70, suggesting that an assessment of additional financial and non-financial items might
support a more sophisticated conceptualization of firm performance (Cheah, Sarstedt, Ringle,
Ramayah, & Ting, 2018; Van der Stede, Chow, & Lin, 2006). Models that include two or more formative
measures or a combination of reflective and formative measures could be readily assessed with higherorder models. More intricate measures of firm performance could contribute to a more granular
explanation of how crisis readiness drives specific organizational outcomes.
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